<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Compliance &amp; Law on Whistleblowing Software</title><link>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/categories/compliance--law/</link><description>Recent content in Compliance &amp; Law on Whistleblowing Software</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/categories/compliance--law/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Mapping HinSchG, Sapin II, and PIDA Onto One Whistleblowing Platform</title><link>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/hinschg-sapin-ii-pida-platform-mapping/</link><pubDate>Sun, 04 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/hinschg-sapin-ii-pida-platform-mapping/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;A multinational employer operating in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom can run &lt;a href="https://wemoral.com/whistleblowing-software"&gt;secure whistleblowing software&lt;/a&gt; across all three regimes if the admin plane exposes five per-tenant switches: anonymous-acceptance, oral-record format, in-person-meeting SLA, headcount calculation rule, and per-artifact retention period. That five-switch model is the information-gain anchor of this post: each switch is driven by a specific section of HinSchG (Germany, in force 2 July 2023, with the late-2023 anonymous-reporting amendment), by the Sapin II decree of 3 October 2022 in France, or by the structure of PIDA 1998 in the UK. The trap most platforms fall into is treating PIDA as if it mandated a channel; PIDA only protects retaliation, it does not require the employer to operate one.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>GDPR for Whistleblowing: Lawful Basis, Retention, Minimization</title><link>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/gdpr-for-whistleblowing-lawful-basis-retention-minimization/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/gdpr-for-whistleblowing-lawful-basis-retention-minimization/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;A whistleblowing platform handles allegations of wrongdoing, names identifiable third parties, and routinely captures special-category data such as harassment, discrimination, or criminal-conduct claims. It is inside &lt;a href="https://gdpr-info.eu/"&gt;GDPR&lt;/a&gt; scope, and three mistakes show up on almost every implementation review. Calling pseudonymous receipt-coded reports &amp;ldquo;anonymous&amp;rdquo; and assuming GDPR no longer applies; selecting consent as the lawful basis even though the freely-given test fails under the employer/employee power imbalance; and treating encryption as an exemption from breach notification when Article 33&amp;rsquo;s 72-hour clock keeps running regardless. This post walks each pitfall, ties it to a specific GDPR article, and shows what the platform must do in product terms.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>EU Directive vs SOX 806 vs Dodd-Frank: One Platform, Three Regimes</title><link>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/eu-directive-vs-sox-806-vs-dodd-frank/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/eu-directive-vs-sox-806-vs-dodd-frank/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;A multinational employer with EU operations and US public-company exposure has to satisfy three whistleblowing regimes from a single platform: &lt;a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1937/oj"&gt;EU Directive 2019/1937&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1514A"&gt;Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href="https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower"&gt;Dodd-Frank Section 922&lt;/a&gt;. The engineering rule of thumb, verified against the three statutes as of April 2026, is to default every workflow to the strictest regime (the EU directive&amp;rsquo;s 7-day acknowledgement and 3-month feedback timers), then layer SOX-specific audit-committee routing and Dodd-Frank&amp;rsquo;s &amp;ldquo;anonymous via counsel&amp;rdquo; carve-out as overlays on top. Configure once to the EU baseline and the US obligations fall into place as additive routing rules, not as competing pipelines.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>EU Directive 2019/1937: 12-Row Engineering Checklist for Channels</title><link>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/eu-directive-2019-1937-technical-checklist/</link><pubDate>Sun, 22 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://whistleblowing-software.pages.dev/posts/eu-directive-2019-1937-technical-checklist/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019L1937"&gt;EU Directive 2019/1937&lt;/a&gt; obliges every private legal entity with 50 or more workers, and most public-sector entities, to operate an internal reporting channel that accepts written and oral reports, acknowledges receipt within 7 days, and gives feedback on action taken within 3 months (extendable to 6 in duly justified cases). The channel must protect the identity of the reporter and any third party named in the report, allow third-party operation under the same safeguards, support an in-person meeting on the reporter&amp;rsquo;s request, and avoid any form of retaliation as defined in Article 19. Translating those legal obligations into product requirements yields a 12-row engineering checklist that any reporting platform must satisfy before it can be considered compliant. As of April 2026, every clause below is still load-bearing under the directive&amp;rsquo;s text on EUR-Lex and the &lt;a href="https://commission.europa.eu/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-fundamental-rights-eu/protection-whistleblowers_en"&gt;European Commission&amp;rsquo;s transposition page&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>